There is a grand tradition in American politics of bashing the other side’s nominees. In the spirit of that tradition, I have a new piece out in the American Conservative that questions whether Susan Rice is fit to be the Biden administration’s nominee for Secretary of State. Rice is a controversial figure for all sorts of reasons. Most go back to her role in the Clinton administration’s response to the Rwandan genocide, or of her handling of the Libyan and Syrian crises in the Obama administration. Most famously, Rice became the Republican beat-up-doll of choice in 2013, when the terrorist attack in Benghazi was being used for maximum partisan advantage.
I have always considered the Benghazi stuff to be a bit spurious. Larger questions surrounding the wisdom of American intervention in Syria and Libya have far more merit, and I was disappointed—if not surprised—to find that Rice’s memoir does not honestly grapple with the poisonous legacies of America’s decision to intervene in either of these conflicts. But my critique of Rice in the American Conservative is not grounded in her behavior in the Near East, but the Far.
The Biden administration has talked a great deal about the need to ground China policy in a cooperative framework with America’s allies. But it is precisely Susan Rice’s track record on this issue that makes Asian diplomats and officials so concerned about her potential return to power. There are two issues at play here here. The first involves Rice’s personal foibles and her consequent dismal reputation across the Indo-Pacific. But also at issue is a broader set of misconceptions about the respective strengths and weaknesses of the Obama and Trump administration’s approach to Asia. My hope is that now that the election is over there is room to be a bit more clear-eyed on these questions. My fear, however, is that the Biden administration will succumb to the sore temptation to abandon any genuine good done over the last four simply because a Trump official was the one who do it. An evenhanded evaluation of the Trump era’s mistakes and accomplishments in this domain is needed, so that new the administration may jettison less helpful schemes without throwing out the policies that increased America’s credibility and leverage in the region.
I am sure that today’s piece will be the first of many in this vein. It should be seen as building on earlier work written by James Crabtree and Jeremy Stern earlier this year.  Both have pointed out that Trumpish diplomacy was not nearly as subversive in Asia as it was in Europe. I particular recommend reading Stern’s eloquent Palladium essay, “America’s New Post-Western Foreign Policy,” which is one of the best pieces I have read on American foreign policy in the 2010s. I quote from Stern in my new American Conservative piece, but if you only have enough time today to read one essay, read his, not mine.
Stern observes that while Obama had a declared commitment to Asia and seemed destined to be the harbinger of a new Pacific order, his administration’s foreign policy was tradition-bound, wedded by ideology and personal style to the values, institutions, issue sets, and personalities of the transatlantic relationship.
Susan Rice personifies the worst tendencies of this strain of Obama-era diplomacy. This is why so many foreign policy figures in countries like Taiwan, Japan, Australia, India, and the ASEAN states dislike her. I provide several quotations to this effect in AmCon. Some might accuse me of cherry picking here, and there is some merit to that critique, but if I am cherry picking—well, Susan Rice is just about the only diplomatic figure that I could cherry pick about. If not every diplomat despises Rice, no other American official generates enough discontent that it leaks out into the open press at all (there are a few more common punching bags in private. One day it might be necessary to write about them too).
The one group of people who unequivocally appreciate Susan Rice are the Chinese. I describe why this is so in my piece:
Above all else, Rice has earned a well-deserved reputation as the senior American official most willing to sacrifice the interests of American partners to chase what Rice calls “expanded cooperation” with Beijing. Susan Rice credits herself with a commanding role in the implementation of Obama’s China strategy. In her memoir Rice describes why she, as National Security Advisor, needed to take control of America’s relationship with China, instead of allowing another NSC “Principal” (like the Secretary of State) to take charge:
China has long preferred dealing directly with the White House on bilateral affairs . . . [and] given the complexity of the relationship, its many economic and strategic facets, and the need to ensure that multiple disparate agencies sing from the same hymnal, strong White House leadership makes sense. As NSA I embraced this responsibility.
This framing may seem innocuous, but its sentiments raise alarm bells across Asia. By elevating U.S.-China relations as the bilateral relationship in American foreign policy (Rice often describes it as “the most consequential bilateral relationship in the world”), the one realm of cooperation that demands continuous cross-domain coordination from the White House itself, Rice devalues America’s actual partners in the region. Taiwanese, Filipino, Australian, and Indian diplomats (to say nothing of their Singaporean, Thai, or Vietnamese counterparts) know that if all aspects of the China relationship are cross-linked, then their interests will always be traded out for better Chinese behavior with respect to Iran, North Korea, climate change, the cyber realm, or any other domain the Chinese decide to pull a tantrum over that week. This framing is even more humiliating for the Japanese. It forces them into an undeserved second-class spot. Though Tokyo is America’s most important ally, the hub on which U.S. foreign policy depends, and a power more crucial to American-led financial and macroeconomic coordination than Beijing has ever been, Tokyo was not given the same bilateral access to the Obama White House that Rice arranged for the Chinese Communist Party. Susan Rice owned the China relationship; Japanese concerns did not command the attention of any of the Principals. Obama hardly spoke to Putin without first hearing Merkel’s take; the Japanese were given little input into American strategy for managing China.
The Trump administration, in contrast, made a point of seeking Japanese input on all aspects of China and North Korea policy, both at the level of the President and those a few rungs below him. In two years Trump had quadruple the personal contact with Prime Minister Abe than Obama had during his two terms as President. As I note,
Before Trump, this sort of cooperation and engagement was reserved for the Chinese, favored European allies, and Middle Eastern countries then subject to American counterinsurgency campaigns. Rice’s autobiography reflects this focus. Of its 482 pages, only 13 cover China—most of which are spent celebrating the administration’s 2015 cyber agreement with Beijing (which never had a credible enforcement mechanism, was still not fully implemented at the end of Obama’s tenure, and was abandoned by the Chinese shortly after he left office) and the administration’s unsuccessful efforts to convince the communists to take a harder line against North Korea. But these 13 pages are a mountain compared to her sparse treatment of America’s Asian partners. Across the book, Japan and India are only given a few scattered mentions. The U.S.-Philippines relationship is reduced to a sentence. There is no entry for “Taiwan” in the index.
Rice boasts in her book that she “understands the interests and the idiosyncrasies” of the Chinese, but never demonstrates similar knowledge or concern with any other power in the region.
There were other examples I could have given in the column had I the space to do so. Rice’s declarations on Asia do not inspire confidence. She was the first American official to adopt China’s “new type of great power relations” framing as official American policy. After leaving office she has repeatedly affirmed the supremacy of the U.S.-China bilateral relationship and continued to argue that all aspects of that relationship should be cross linked to each other. See this interview for a good example of that sort of talk—and see that terrible quote at the end:
Rice also told Rose that although China has been more aggressively building a presence in the South China Sea, she believes the U.S. has “managed” them in that regard.
We managed them! America did not manage the Chinese in the South China Sea; they managed us. That an American official could look at the aftermath of the Scarborough Shoal incident and spin it as some sort of victory in relationship management—well, is it any surprise that she has such a low reputation in the region?
Biden ran on a return to normalcy. He also ran a friend to the American alliance system. The tension here is that America’s Indo-Pacific partners do not want a restoration of the 2016 status quo. They have benefited in too many ways from being at the diplomatic center of America’s newfound strategic approach to China. The Trump administration’s abrasive, tackless, and at times malicious dealings with our European partners were unnecessary, and evils done there must be undone. But another factor behind European angst is the larger shift in American attention, resources, and commitments from West to East. This shift must not end. It would be a mistake for Biden to restore the old Obama administration’s obsession with European issues and Middle Eastern crises on the one hand, and the privileged position it gave to Chinese perspectives on the other. That is what is actually at stake in Rice’s appointment.
 Jeremy Stern, “America’s New Post-Western Foreign Policy,” Palladium (4 September 2020); James Crabtree, “Asian leaders underestimate the danger of Trump’s reelection,” Nikkei (27 February 2020); “Biden Has a Serious Credibility Problem in East Asia,” Foreign Policy (10 September 2020).
 Tanner Greer, “Susan Rice is Asia’s Worst Nightmare,” American Conservative (19 November 2020).
 “Susan Rice: “We can’t afford to play fast and loose” with China,” CBS News (17 January 2017).
In case you haven't been paying attention, the election isn't over.
Trump administration's China policy has been a total failure. Its trade war against China is a disaster. The trade deficit with China had not been reduced-the single most important goal of the trade war. 3,500 US companies are suing the administration for its increased tariffs on Chinese imports. Chinese export to the US only decreased slightly, about 10%, but was offset by the increased exports to ASEAN and EU. The China-centered RCEP has just been signed by the fifteen countries in the Asia-Pacific region, including US allies Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, sans India, the country that Trump administration has courted to contain China. The EU-China BIT is widely to be signed by the end of the year, and Xi Jinping just announced that China is open to join CPTPP. The tech war against China has elicited a strong response – not so much in counter sanctions – in terms of self-reliance with huge long term investments. The doubling down of China 2025, the plan that the administration aimed at. All these will havve a long term negative effects on US high-tech companies. Furthermore, the intervention and manipulation in Hong Kong's violent protests and so-called pro-democracy movement has back-fired. China has struck back and is now in the process of truly taking over Hong Kong. The Taiwan card has been heavily utilized, recklessly I should say, and China has announced its accelerated military modernization plan, with an intermediate goal of 2027. This is a target date set for Taiwan, paving the way for Taiwan to be unified by force or at least by coercion within the next decade, thanks to the overt and covert collaboration of the Taiwanese pro-independence government and Trump administration pushing for the Taiwan Independence agenda.
Your characterization that the Asia-Pacific countries have been enjoying or even welcome Trump's anti-China policy there gross misrepresentation. Most of the countries do not want to choose side between the US and China and would not like to see the two superpowers fighting each other. To be sure, there are a few countries trying to take advantage of the US hostility against China and are now suffering the consequences. Look at Australia now. China is now striking back at the Aussie and they were panicked. India was another country that try to leverage Trump's anti-China policy and is now in a tough quandary. It is put into a bind by China. On the one hand, it dares not to take any preemptive military action against China for fear of devastating retaliation, and yet China is not withdrawing troops from the China-India border region and India had to engage in an arm race it could ill afford. All the empty posturing like signing some treaties with the US and joint military exercises could only make China harden its stance against India, with large-scale infrastructure investment, military facilities improvements, and upgrades of military equipment. Namely, China finally gives India's attention and priority it has been craving for. At a time when India is suffering from severe pandemic and economic downfall.
So your advocate of carrying over Trump era anti-China policy is out of sync with reality. Trump was on to something to want to withdraw from America's global overreach, but was wrong to make hostility to China the center piece, especially when it was hijacked by emotions and lunatics such as Mike Pompeo, Matt Pottinger, Peter Navarro and the like in the last year or so of his administration. It will take Biden a lot to repair the damages, if they can be repaired.
Speaking from one of the many countries under USA suzerainty, this article is pure wishful thinking: since WW2, the foreign policy of the USA and of protectorates like Japan, Philippines, Taiwan, NATO countries, etc. is whatever the USA President and DOD want it to be (major example: coalition of the willing, 2nd Iraq war), and when they consult those protectorates usually as a formality. In that no recent administration has made a difference. Sure, some protectorates are allowed to be less cooperative on some non-core aspects, but that does not change the direction of USA policy, which follows only the USA's own interests. Consultations with asian countries on the USA policy with China are not going to change anything substantial; the asian countries know well that the only way to influence USA policy is not through official channels, but with political donations.
«America did not manage the Chinese in the South China Sea; they managed us»
Anti chinese propaganda blinds american "useful idiots" to something that is not a detail, that the Communist Party of Vietnam "managed" the whole issue: their base building and their territorial waters claims in it have been even larger and more ridiculously stretched than those of the chinese, because the Communist Party of Vietnam obviously want to be able to choke shipping between China (and secondarily Korea, Japan) and south-east Asia, India, Africa and the Middle East:
The chinese (whether mainland or Taiwan) have been largely reacting to that, the last thing they want is for a large part of their trade or oil imports to be at the whim of the Communist Party of Vietnam. American policy has become one of gifting control of shipping over the South China Sea to the Communist Party of Vietnam, something to to me seems quite amazingly stupid, and a policy that the other asian countries are really upset about. The countries of Asia probably are not happy about chinese control over their shipping with China, but they can live with it, but vietnamese control is something much worse for them (trade between south east Asia and Taiwan, Japan, south Korea is less important and can go by a slightly longer, USA-controlled, route).
Some all too clever foreign policy people will then say that the calculation is to get the Communist Party of Vietnam to fight "forever" over control of the South China Sea with the chinese, while the USA watch with amusement their wasting time and resources in that fight, but that calculation is both dangerous (if the fight becomes hot) and has a fundamental flaw: what if instead of fighting over it "forever", that fight gets resolved and either side gets the upper hand and gets to control an important shipping choke-point? What then?
Well, if the vietnamese communists win, the USA Pacific Fleet can wipe them off the Spratlys probably in a few hours if it needs to, but what if the chinese win instead?