Why Can’t We See the Cause of our Defeat?

The backside of a “Truman Dollar” distributed by the Women’s Brigade for Eisenhower and Nixon as part of the 1952 campaign.

CORRUPTION IS THE GREATEST ENEMY to the coalition that Donald Trump built in 2024, and to the populist platform that Trump campaigned on that year.

 Corruption saps vitality. It breeds impotence. A corrupt government struggles to implement coherent policy; a corrupt party struggles to mobilize outside support. A populist movement beset by corruption does not endure. Sooner or later, its voters bolt. This is especially true with corruption at the summit. Populism erupts forth when large masses believe the deck is stacked against them, when the game is rigged for the benefit of someone else. The high and mighty are someone else. They are in fact the worst sort of someone else—they are rich. A populist leader who allows the rich to flense his electorate walks the short road to defeat.

We were delivered such a defeat last week.

 Corruption was the single most important issue of the 2026 elections. Republicans were not prepared for this. They were surprised by it. Many still deny it. Why? Why have Republican politicians, operators, and intellectuals been so ready to dismiss the wave gathering on the horizon? Why do so many still discount its strength, even after it has crashed onto shore and swept us all out to sea?

 That is the topic of my latest editorial in the New York Times. You can read it here.1

1

Tanner Greer, “Republicans Are Still Clueless About Why They Lost,” The New York Times (10 November 2026)

Before I get to the main thesis of that piece, let me lay out a few additional thoughts on corruption that could not fit into the tight word-count constraints of a Times op-ed.

The optimum amount of corruption in a political system is not zero. Zero is not possible, and attempts to reach zero are not laudable. Horse trading, log rolling, pork barrel spending, and the tamer forms of graft are needed for the proper functioning of most legislative systems. In politics, money is an all-purpose lubricant; it greases the gears of the great machine. Political systems that are too open, too rigid, or too squeaky-clean tend towards paralysis. That way lies gridlock. That way lies rancor. Banish the back rooms, ban the under-tables, cut down all closed doors—and watch political life freeze into stalemate and spite.  

For similar reasons, any half-decent industrial policy comes packaged with aspects of graft. We should not delude ourselves on this point. Whatever else it might mean, industrial policy means picking winners and losers. That is what industrial policy is.  A wise political coalition will make sure its friends are among the winners. This is in fact one of the obvious benefits of a coherent industrial policy—it makes friends out of the industries you believe are most important to your nation’s future. Such friends are worth having. Those friendships guarantee the wealth and strength of a nation. That strength and that wealth arenot possible without some measure of partiality. There will be revolving doors and preferential standards and firms whose wealth depends entirely on the good graces of the coalition in power. That is just how the thing works. To have the thing at all, you must tolerate some level of graft.

So the realist might say. But our realist would not stop there: he would add that this sort of graft should be kept to its necessary minimum. When money must flow, it should be used to keep clients happy and enemies quiet. The law should not line the pockets of high officials—or their secretaries, spouses, or children. Classified material should not be used for private gain. Private gain should not be flaunted. It should not be blatant. The populist should not soak in luxury.

Of course, we have seen something very different over the last two years. We have seen influence peddling, foreign emoluments, financial blackmail, nepotistic profiteering, pay-to-play access schemes, pump-and-dump crypto schemes, cash-for-clemency pardon schemes, and a proliferation of shady no-bid contracts and insider betting on classified intel. Some of this has been done behind the president’s back. Much of it has been done in a shameless and public manner. Often we see our president cavort about with convicted fraudsters and thieves. All of it has occurred in atmosphere of Versailles-like opulence—an atmosphere certain to rouse popular suspicion and stoke populist resentment.

Do you recall the president’s promise to “take back our country from a sick political class that got rich selling America out?” Do you remember his vow “to rescue our nation from a failed and corrupt political establishment?” How do you think the median American voter understood these promises, these vows? When Trump campaigned against a “corrupt political establishment,” did the Americans who voted for him believe he was simply planning to supplant one corrupt establishment with another? Of course not. This man was elected to drain the swamp, not to wallow in it. How could Trump’s coalition view the happenings of the last two years as anything less than abject betrayal?

Nevertheless, we were slow to see it. The conservative ecosystem was slow to perceive the rising anger—so slow, in fact, that we still have not fashioned stock talking points in response to it. The administration’s rejoinder was all last-minute slapdashery: a tipline for SNAP fraud stood up two weeks before the polls opened, paired with a round of town halls where the vice president solemnly assured the American people that “Donald Trump hates it when people make money off of him.”

Why did we think that would work? How did we find ourselves responding to the election’s most pressing issue…. with an eleventh-hour tipline? Why were we caught so flat-footed, so wholly without a plan?

In my piece for the New York Times, I suggest several answers to this question. The first and most obvious is fear. Perhaps many foresaw the public’s fury. But foresight is not courage. Did anyone dare to warn the president of what was coming? Or did he only realize the costs of corruption when the October polls spelled it out for him?

But fear does not explain the problem away. I have spent much of the last year trying to convince other Republicans that this issue was going to kill us. I did this privately, not publicly—the message was more credible that way. I was dismayed by how many dismissed my arguments out of hand. These conversations required no courage on my part; few, if any, of my interlocutors were personally involved in any sort of graft. We talked in private. They did not need to dismiss the issue to protect themselves. But they dismissed the issue anyway.

Why?

Here is how I put things in the New York Times:

The temptation is to write off the whole business as AstroTurfing, or as displaced economic discontent, cleverly channeled by Democratic activists into a platform for prosecution…..

Republicans drew a particular lesson from [their victory in 2024]: The concerns of America’s educated liberals were not the concerns of the wider electorate. Ordinary Americans just do not care much about the procedural integrity of America’s hallowed institutions. To the average voter, those are airy abstractions. The educated liberal will vote on abstractions; the ordinary American will not. And it is the ordinary American, not the educated liberal, who has the power to elect presidents and senators.

Here the American right correctly clocked the defining weakness of American liberals: They conflate rules with results. After the election, it was fashionable for young rightists to express this idea by quoting the film “No Country for Old Men”: “If the rule you followed brought you to this, of what use was the rule?”

Democrats deified rules — and lost. Mr. Trump would not repeat their mistake. He would bend the rules. Republicans understood that the president and his party would be judged on what he did for his nation, not on how he did it. For the right, this was the lesson of Mr. Trump’s victory: In American politics, outcomes are all that matter.

There is merit in this view, but also danger. It blinded otherwise perceptive Republican operatives to political risks… They heard how the liberal commentariat framed the problem: a crisis of criminal malfeasance, a breach in the rule of law, a degradation of the presidency. And they dismissed it as warmed-over resistance rhetoric — just with dollar signs thrown in.

That is where Republicans erred. They misjudged what corruption means to ordinary American voters. These voters do not care about corruption for the reasons liberal columnists tend to, but they are no less angry. These voters see corruption for what it is: rich men getting richer at their expense. Americans hate — really, truly hate — to play the patsy: Corruption makes a patsy of us all.

In a funny way, our problem is that we could not escape the framing of the enemy. Our understanding of the issue was born out of, and in opposition to, the #Resistance frame. We never shook off these flawed concepts. Most of us still  have not. Take this post by New Right tweetmeister Fischer King, which passed onto my timeline this morning:

Fischer King duels the dead. The Democrats will hold hearings; they will have investigations; they will subpoena. But they will not investigate and subpoena in the name of democracy. I am sure some of the Dems will say that, but this is no longer the main thrust. Instead they will hold hearings, investigate officials, and issue subpoenas to evict “a sick political class that got rich selling America out.” That is what Jon Ossoff and all of these red-state Democrats actually campaigned on. They understand what corruption means to the average voter. They won on that understanding. But we are still wasting time warring against the ghosts of campaigns past.  

I am pessimistic about the next two years. Of all the big issues at play during the last election, this is the hardest to address. We can end the Iran War. We can adjust the tariff regime. We can change our approach to the data centers. But short of something drastic—say, donating the president’s portfolio to the Trump accounts of America’s children—there is little we can do to quell the public anger around corruption. We made our bed. We have little choice but to lie in it.

I do not think a strategy of “both sides” whataboutism will succeed here. Rooting out malfeasance in Minnesota or California or in federal welfare programs is a fine and righteous thing to do, but it will not take the spotlight off malfeasance at the top. It should be obvious why voters care more about one than the other. The presidency is a national institution; the president is the central symbol of his entire party. State welfare administrators are minor bureaucrats; they do not have a national remit. The beneficiaries of corruption in both cases also differ. The Trump administration is staffed by a wealthy set. The administration’s friends are fantastically rich. Handouts to the rich are not the same as handouts to people from other classes. A corrupt NGO director will cause disgust; a corrupt billionaire, rage.  

I do not think the next two years will be a repeat of the first Trump impeachment proceedings, nor will they look much like the Biden-era lawfare campaign against Donald Trump. Democrats have learned something from their failures. They will not start with the president. They do not need to. To borrow a term from Xi Jinping’s purges, the Democrats will do just fine “peeling the onion” (bāo yángcōng 剥洋葱).

They will start with the underlings and the associates and work their way in. They will hit the Trump kids before they get to Trump; they will hit the business associates and bodymen of the Trump kids before they get to the Trump kids themselves; they will do all of that with the Lutnick kids and their people long before they hit anyone working with the Trump family directly. As long as they exercise a modicum of self-control, this is a game the Democrats cannot lose. Pardoning the sorry bastards peeled off the onion will only highlight the administration’s tolerance of corruption; not pardoning them allows investigators to build their case and peel to a layer deeper.

The last time graft was a deciding issue in a presidential election was 1952. This has faded completely from the popular consciousness. We do not remember Henry Vaughn and James Hunt and John Maragon, nor the Hoey Committee’s investigation of them. We do not remember Donald Dawson and William Boyle, nor the Fulbright Committee’s investigation of them. We do not remember James Finnegan and his five dozen IRS cronies, nor the King subcommittee’s investigation of them. We do not remember the uproar over mink coats, deep freezers, and Five Percenters. We do not remember that Eisenhower and Nixon campaigned on “Korea, Communism, and Corruption.”2 All of that has gone down the memory hole.

2

I would not be aware of it save for William Manchester’s account in The Glory and the Dream: A Narrative History of America, 1932-1972 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1973), 731-743.

Perhaps we should try and remember. During the final years of Truman’s presidency, his approval rating hovered in the 20s. His last years came after a dizzying bout of inflation. On election day itself the average voter associated the Truman administration with two failings: corruption at home and stalemate abroad. They voted accordingly. In one great swoop, the opposition party won control of the House, the Senate, and the presidency.

Worst of all? Truman was not even on the ballot.

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Your support makes this blog possible. To get updates on new posts published at the Scholar’s Stage, you can join the Scholar’s Stage Substack mailing list, follow my twitter feed, or support my writing through Patreon. If you found this post worth reading, you might find some of my other essays on the American right worth reading: “On Bombing Iran,” “The Legacy of Charlie Kirk,” “Why Republican Leaders Matter More Than Democratic Ones,” “The Problem of the New Right,” “Further Notes on the New Right.”

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