Introducing the Center for Strategic Translation

Many readers have wondered at my low writing output this year. This week I am happy to announce the answer to the riddle: the Center for Strategic Translation.

The Center for Strategic Translation locates, translates, and annotates documents of historic or strategic value that are only available in Chinese. As director of the new center I have had the chance to work with a host of talented translators to make this project a reality.


Tanner Greer, “Why We Need the Center for Strategic Translation,” Palladium, 14 November 2022.




Xie Tao, “From the Rise of Populism to the Return of History.” Translated by Dylan Levi King. San Francisco: Center for Strategic Translation, 2022. 

Originally published in 张蕴岭,楊光斌,等 [Zhang Yunling, Yang Guangbin, et. al.],  “Ruhe lijie yu renshi bainian dabianju如何理解于認識百年大變局 [How to Understand and Recognize Great Changes of the Century]”,  Yatai Anquan Yu Haiyang Yanjiu 亚太安全与海洋研究 2, no. 24 (2019): 1-15.

Over at Palladium I have written an introduction to the Center and its work. In that piece I describe the Center as a solution to two problems that face the world of China watching—one sociological, one methodological:

in Xi Jinping’s “New Era,” many of the tools China specialists relied on to understand communist politics have become outdated…. Many experts who came of age in the 1990s and 2000s graduated from academic departments where quantitative methods and formal models were the focus of training. For the smaller cadre of scholars still interested in qualitative assessments of China, the old arts of open-source “Pekingology” held less luster than in days past. After all, field surveys and personal interviews with party officials were only a plane ride away. 

This worked during the ‘90s and the aughts, the heydays of Reform and Opening. This open interregnum has now ended. Field surveys in China are no longer possible. Archives have closed. Officials no longer give interviews. In the age of Xi Jinping, the tools that a generation of “China hands” relied on to understand communist politics no longer shed light. The West contests the future with a country we lack the means to understand.1

At this same time, the composition of those debating China policy has changed:

Xi’s New Era has elevated China policy from a niche concern managed by a small community of specialists to a centerpiece of national debate. Over the last six years, we have witnessed an influx of new voices in these discussions. Some of these newcomers come to China policy with a deep background in fields like finance, trade law, or military operations; others come to China policy as true generalists, having made their name as pundits or politicians. Most of these newcomers lack the language skills, advanced degrees, or in-country experience that distinguished the China hands of yore.

Established experts will always be tempted to respond to this influx with displeasure. It is frustrating to spend decades of one’s life building a fine-grained picture of a complex system only to be sidelined in favor of outsiders whose interest in the topic will last only as long as it is at the top of the White House’s agenda. Though understandable, this reaction is short-sighted. A narrow band of specialists can dominate the field without interference from policy generalists only when their chosen specialty is so niche that no one but themselves can muster any interest in it. China hands like myself made a career out of watching China because we believed that the intricacies of Chinese politics mattered not just for China, but for the rest of the world as well. Now, for the first time, we find that the rest of the world agrees with us. 

For countries like Australia or the United States, there is now an obvious China angle to every diplomatic initiative. China policy can no longer be the province of narrow expertise. Those impacted by China policy demand a say in its goals and execution—and they have gotten it. The challenge facing the China hands of the twenty-first century is to integrate these new entrants into existing debates.2

My answer to the first problem will not surprise long term readers here at the Stage: read what the Communist Party of China is saying, then take it seriously. No matter how closed China becomes, Party directives will still be circulated, propaganda will still be published, and slogans will still cycle through the system. These things are necessary for the functioning of the Party. We can be assured of their existence in the days to come.

The difficulty with this approach, however, will be apparent to anyone who has tried to read this stuff: “party speak” is stilted, opaque, and stuffed with slogans whose full meanings can only be understood by those familiar with their intellectual genealogy and history of use.

Gaining that familiarity means a fluency in Chinese trained on a constant diet of propaganda. It means extensive study of party history. This is a reasonable expectation for expert specialists, but not for the generalists and decision makers who will be guiding China policy in the real world. To meet their needs translation is not enough: translated texts must be presented with an interpretive apparatus that does all of that for them.

Thus we decided to preface every translation with an introductory essay that makes the authoritativeness and intentions of the translated document clear. We have also created a glossary that explains the origin, historical use, and current meaning of the slogans and political terms used in the translated documents. It is fairly small right now, but it shall grow with each new translated document My hope is that it will eventually become a critical resources for expert China hands and interested laymen alike.

Our first set of translations come from the same source: a 2019 round-table put on by two Chinese think tanks on the theme of “great changes unseen in a century” (百年未有大变局). The term is sort of a short hand reference for the party’s judgment that just as imperial Britain lost its hegemonic role in the international system a century ago, so the United States is losing its hegemony today. But why is this happening? And what does it mean for China? This was the question put to the round-table participants, all eminent academics in Beijing.

A general introduction to this round-table and the “great changes” phrase can be found here. I encourage you to read all six entries. The most interesting, in my opinion, was written by Xie Tao, a Beijing “America expert” who got a PhD in American politics from Northwestern in the aughts. In “From the Rise of Populism to the Return of History” Xie argues that: “All tides that rise must fall. All living men must age, sicken, and die. Therefore, the United States must accept that the day will come where it too will fall into decline.”3

Xie divides recent Western history into three big chunks: the boom years that followed the Great Depression and lasted through the 1970s, the Neoliberal era, which end with the Great Recession, and the current period, the era of right wing populism. He expects this era to “continue for ten or twenty more years.” This is completely in line with the other round table respondents, who are all convinced that right-wing populism is both a sign of American decline and the inevitable outcome of neoliberal excess. The respondents generally describe Trump’s rise as a transition point in American politics. Trump revealed the bankruptcy of liberalism even in its birthland. Some of the participants–like Yang Guangbin–believe that liberalism was always bankrupt, an artificial ideology weaponized by Westerners to shore up their domestic politics and to subject foreigners to their political control. Xie is not that cynical. He sees the failure of liberalism as a chosen by liberals themselves:

Another explanation for the appearance of right-wing populism is as a response to the rise of identity politics, or, perhaps more accurately, as a fierce revolt against the gradual shift since the 1970s toward what has been called “post-materialist values.” To summarize this idea briefly, two decades of postwar economic prosperity led many young people in the West to place less importance on material stability than the expression of their values. These post-materialist values include personal liberty, freedom to choose one’s own sexual orientation, civil rights crusades, political correctness, protecting the environment, promoting human rights, and so forth. In the United States, the Democratic Party has become a bastion for identity politics, with the majority of their supporters being drawn from ethnic and sexual minority groups.

The tragedy of identity politics is that it prioritizes calls for respect and self-expression over demands for more conventional economic redistribution. The reality is that the vast majority of average citizens care more about their economic interests than the right of a small minority to use a certain bathroom. A backlash against these values and rising economic inequality combined to cause a surge in right-wing populism, and it also contributed to the Democratic Party’s electoral loss in 2016.4



The implication here is that if the left has remained focused on its traditional economic mission, we would live in an age defined by left wing populism, not its reactionary counterpart.

Above this tale of competing populisms is a larger story of hubris and decline. Xie thinks that Americans truly believe in liberal shibboleths–and that this blinds them from seeing their own decline. America is a country that no longer has state capacity; it cannot govern. If Americans had studied history they would realize that they are playing out the same story of rise and decline as so many empires in days past.

The Americans do not realize what is happening, however, because they believe they are “exceptional.” American ideology stops Americans from recognizing the reality of decline–much less diagnosing its true causes. They must find a scapegoat for their sinking fortunes. “This is the reason,” Xie concludes, “why the Sino-American relationship is at its lowest ebb since Richard Nixon’s visit in 1972.”5



I encourage you to read the entire thing. I also encourage you to sign up for the CST substack or follow the CST twitter to keep up with what we publish in the future.

Leave a Comment


you really should add an rss feed or email subscription to the project’s site, else new articles will not be noticed by your readers.

also the “submit” button in the “contact” section of the website does not appear to work in firefox.

Congratulations Tanner.

Will be very interested in reading translations regarding the Russian war in Ukraine through the PLA’s eyes. In particular, I suspect the PLA are keenly taking notes on Russia’s Shahed / Geran kamikaze drone ‘electric war’ targeting the Ukrainian power grid and wondering if disabling Taiwan’s power grid with loitering munitions and maintaining an aero naval blockade would be sufficient to compel a capitulation—once it becomes clear in Taipei that the US isn’t willing to risk the 7th Fleet followed by a civilization-threatening thermonuclear showdown over one small island it officially still acknowledges is a legal part of China.

My handle namesake Col Douglas Macgregor (USA ret) may have been significantly premature in his forecasts but quantity still has a quality all its own and attrition still does not favor the post West.

Do you share Carlsbad1819’s view that antisemitism is a normal and healthy response by Gentiles in light of Jewish involvement in the forging of liberal society post WW2?

No, that is a stupid and odious idea. Antisemtism’s roots are far older than post WWII liberal society, Jews are hardly more responsible for the contours of liberal society than WASPs are, and I am hardly so hostile to the post war order that it would drive me to ethnic hatred. That entire line of thought stinks of ancient prejudice dressed up in rationalist language; it is hard to take the sincerity of anyone who argues it seriously.

Fair enough, it’s just that I had seen some of his material reviewed favorably here, and a lot of his output is steeped in antisemitism.

No idea where that [possibly Kanye West inspired?] interlude came from…but I have found Tanner in my personal experience to be a very fair and balanced host of competing ideas in the comments, even tolerating my Douglas Macgregor inspired contrarian-ness, regardless of some forecasts being premature.

We’re living in an era where an Establishment after repulsing the spectacularly failed ‘Trumpist’ challenge is increasingly feeling its oats as all powerful militarily–‘Turbo America’ in the words of the Croat-Canadian Substacker Niccolo Soldo–waging a hot Second Cold War aka ‘WorldWarWoke’ with a decades of American deindustrialization resulting shortage of shells [and ironically still leaning on Ukraine’s 1980s Soviet SAM legacy which remains superior to any NATO provided air defenses to prevent its troops from getting carpet bombed]. Turbo America is distinctly failing to complete its universalist conquests culturally in Russophilic India or the indifferent Turkish or pro-Russian Afro-Muslim world, while economically ravaging dollar denominated emerging market borrowers and cannibalizing the Franco-German EU periphery to buy the Anglo-American 5Eyes core a few more bubble bursting years.

As evident by the hysteria over one apple cart shaking billionaire in Elon Musk, who is doing his best to invite the disaffected and dissenting Right back into the social media swimming pool—don’t worry the water’s warm kids I’m anti-censorship–all is not well in the hearts and minds of the Empire. And the costs–in terms of middle class and savings swallowing food/medical/housing costs inflation, homeless tents blooming like mushrooms close to Beverly Hills and the White House, and cemeteries full of freshly dug graves as far as the eye and low flying drone photography can see amid a sea of blue gold flags waving in the Ukrainian steppe wind [and miniature versions on the NATO side of the border full of disavowed recently discharged Polish soldiers]…continue to expand. But there’s a lot of ruin in a nation and a surprisingly greater willingness to bleed and die for what the elites have decided is an indispensable client state of the Empire than had been previously imagined in Moscow, Brussels or Berlin.

Without veering too far off topic, the number of Volga Dnieper Antonov 124 and Russian Air Force cargo flights to China shown on Twitter and Telegram channels continues to expand. And those big planes aren’t hauling basic circuitboards for Russian cruise missiles or DJI drones that would be far cheaper to ship by rail or truck. As we’ve been saying for a while the CCP Central Committee and PLA high command realizing that contributing to its Russian ally destroying or wearing out as much American-sent equipment as possible on the Ukrainian steppes so there’s less available for the U.S. to ship to Taiwan was only a matter of time.

I do not endorse carlsbad generally: I mentioned him once, in one comment thread, as having won a debate with other internet reactionaries. Like many in that sphere he is well read and has a talent for finding interesting documents that the rest of the world has long forgotten. His argument that 19th century liberalism died at the beginning of the 20th century is correct; I cited it in an argument with another internet reactionary in that thread on the theory that he would likely take Carlsbad more seriously than myself.

Xi hosting Medvedev this week:

The temptation with any project like this will be either to translate the lunatics (MEMRI) or the most dovish and pro Western academics left in China, who have no actual power or influence. I think Tanner will give a balanced view. As I’ve said in my relentlessly contrarian even if chastened by timing comments here, the Establishment consensus can keep doubling down in Ukraine and getting what it wants in the US and in the EU, but at an ever more awful cost…

Unlike my namesake Col. Douglas Macgregor USA ret. I will refrain from making any more major predictions about the Ukraine War. I can admit to underestimating last spring especially both the UAF and what 24/7 pumping ‘clobber lists’ from the world’s best CISR and now $100 bln plus 2,000 armored vehicles and hundreds of artillery pieces into them could accomplish–if my critics adhering to the Blob clearly underestimated the resiliency and eastward pivot of the Chinese-aided Russian economy and arms industry now cranking out T90Ms, drones and missiles around the clock under the lengthiest sanctions known to man. Except I will say, I think Col. Macgregor is wrong in expecting a big arrow Russian winter offensive is imminent–the slow grind on the three present fronts will continue combined with stepped up sabotage and destruction of Ukrainian rail yards, fuel and ammo dumps in the rear.

That being said, I seriously doubt the timing of Zelensky’s first trip to Washington since the war started, the announcement of Patriot missile shipments and Medvedev’s visit to Uncle Xi were entirely coincidental. Something big involving China is indeed up, and I suspect it’s related to the critical depletion of Ukraine’s Soviet legacy air defense which along with round the clock AWACS early warning has been integral to preventing the Russian Air Force from engaging in far more devastating bombing of the UAF’s front lines and logistics thus far. To the point that I think the American and British commanders helping run Kyiv’s war have grown smug and complacent about Russian airpower. Rather than Wing Loong drones or drone components, perhaps what those An124 flights to and from China are actually carrying is Norinco standoff glide bombs. In which case the much delayed cheap Iranian radar seeker on Shahed kamikaze drone swarms accompanied RuAF SEAD/DEAD intensified air campaign is almost here. I would not want to be one of the UAF’s Vergeltungswaffen artillerymen targeting downtown Donetsk civilians with that large of a 500 pounder or thermite drop target on my back.

Most likely something like this is being airlifted from China to Russia:

From Xi and the State Council perspective if the Americans are supplying the Ukrainians with JDAMs than China is more than justified in mirroring this by supplying PGMs and or licensing permission like the Iranians did with the Shaheds and Arash 2s to build them from Chinese kits in Russia.

I’ll conclude my comments in this thread by once again asking: did it occur to anyone in Washington, the Pentagon or Langley prior to February 2022 that if the strategy was to draw the Russians into a giant Afghan Bear Trap on steroids in Ukraine and bleed and humiliate them before the final boss showdown with the main GAE antagonist China that the Chinese (and for that matter the Iranians) could anticipate this scenario and do their damndest short of sending troops to support the Russian economy and war effort?

Thinking your enemies are static and stupid is a good way to get beat.